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TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM X- 64782
RECORDING AND CATALOGING HAZARDS INFORMATION
SECTION I. SUMMARY
The concept of checklists has been applied universally to jog the
memory, as a supplement to recall abilities for accurate or complete per-
formance of functions ranging from mundane activities such as buying
groceries to operating aircraft, repairing mechanical devices, or conducting
space flight activities. Their forms vary from "you should buy" (shopping
lists) to "did you do" or "you should. do" (design and operations). They may
or may not be aimed at eliciting a simple "yes", "no", or "not applicable"
response. However, it is believed that providing for such simple responses
for each item tends to ensure that the item is, in fact, considered, and that
the information or instruction it contains is applied where needed.
As modern developments progress into more and more complex
products, the lessons learned from allied experience or previous analyses
become more and more difficult to recall. Thus, the use of the principle of
checklists in its more sophisticated applications becomes more demanding
and in itself more complex. Retrieval, as well as formulation, becomes of
concern and must, if the principle is to find ready application, be easily
located and intelligently used. Thus, the system herein described is an
attempt to supply a structure for formulating checklists which, of itself, is
conducive to practicable retrieval and application by the user.
Checklists can be used for at least four purposes in complex and/or
new product development. These purposes are: (i) training and motivation
of personnel, (2) conversion of noted conditions and/or situations into
languages suitable to specifications and procedures, (3) new product design
review and approval, and (4) the support of hazard analyses.
In a more general sense,. it is by the assistance of the recorded word
that the memory of past things is preserved and the foreknowledge of some
things to come is revealed; by words even things inanimate instruct and
admonish us.. So it is with the checklists. They are only tools, albeit useful
tools, in the effort to achieve the basic objective of producing fault-free
products, and it is to that end that this systematic approach to analyzing,
cataloging, and recording hazard information is directed.
I-
SECTION II. INTRODUCTION
It has long been recognized that products, especially in the case of new
products developed for highly exacting tasks such as spaceflight, must function
not only reliably but safely. This latter necessity has focused considerable
attention upon activities required to ensure maximum safety, not only to flight
crews (in the case of manned flight), but to equipment as well. These
activities have evolved a new engineering discipline devoted to identifying
hazardous conditions and/or situations. In addition, this discipline ensures
that corrective or control measures are implemented by responsible groups.
Those hazards that cannot be corrected represent risks which management
must factor into their decisions for program continuance or discontinuance.
This brief resume focuses on two vital functions associated with
safety; hazards identification and hazard control. The consanguinity of these
two functions and the necessity for assuring their comprehensive treatment
has prompted Dr. Leslie W. Ball, Director of Safety and Manned Flight
Awareness Office, MSFC, to develop the systematic methodology described
herein.
SECTION II I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Initial steps toward organizing hazard identification and control
activities into a universally acceptable system turned toward reviews and
analyses of accident histories. This vast reservoir of information was found
to be not only subjective, but indiscriminate. Quite frequently the distinctive-
ness of cause and effect was blurred, frustrating attempts to identify the basic
mechanics of accidents. These conditions led to the realization that ordered
recording and reporting of accidents was essential if past history and
experience were to be preserved for future use. Such considerations suggest
a need for a revised approach to accident cause analysis, reporting, and
classification, one that would lend itself to universally acceptable logical
processes and permit identification of fundamental principles bound up in the
chain of circumstances surrounding accidents.
Contemplating accidents creates mental images of fires, explosions,
collisions, all of which are symbolic of death, destruction, pain, and/or, in
some fashion, unpleasantness. From earliest experience, therefore, the
term "accident" associates itself with experiences, ranging from matches
singeing the skin to broken bones, all unpleasant experiences that tend to
condition mental attitudes toward safety, and generically conceived as
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preventing those experiences from recurring. This collage of attitudes
inhibits rather than assists the process of dispassionately considering acci-
dents in detached and scientific terms. It also leads to confusing causes,
results, and circumstances surrounding accidents and renders of marginal
value analytical studies based upon such information. Balanced reflection
has led to the conviction that a more effective approach lies in the direction
of determining incremental components of accident systems much more
accurately than the differentiating capacity of our senses permit; i.e., fire,
explosion, collision. It must be remembered, however, that any indirect
quantitative determination and any establishment of a systematic approach
not manifest to the senses is possible only on the basis of theories. Verifica-
tion takes place by testing them in all their consequences and finding that they
yield concordant results.
For this analysis it is decisive to isolate simple occurrences within
the complexity of facts and to dissect the course of events into simple recur-
rent elements. For the practical viewpoint the system must fulfill the require-
ment that it reproducibly adapts itself to all situations/conditions as accurately
as possible.
Such accidents as fires, explosions, and collisions possess one
common denominator, energy. Adapting this concept to a review of accident
histories leads to the general hypothesis that essentially all accidents are
relatable to energy in one form or another, and suggests that an attempt to
classify both accidents and hazards on the basis of energy types and phenomena
may very well lead to fruitful results. Reviewing the vast number of accidents
reported every day, and pondering the effects of those accidents, leads invar-
iably to the realization that accidents are trisectional in nature when considered
as energy mechanisms; high energy, low energy, and energy deprivations. In
the high energy class are those accidents reported as fires, explosions,
collisions, structural damage, and electrocution. Low energy class accidents
are reported as personal injuries (cuts, poisoning, strains, frost bite, and
minor burns), and property damage arising from corrosion, termites, strains,
and tears. In the area of deprivation of needed energies are physical situations
such as entrapment and physiological situations such as suffocation.
Energy has been scientifically defined, studied, identified, and charac-
terized in five distinct regimes; kinetic, potential, chemical, electrical, and
nuclear. If these types of energies can be related to accidents, a train of
thought may very well be established yielding logical and systematic methods
of analyzing information concerning their basic mechanics. It is obvious that
controlled energy is the basic ingredient in the caldron of modern civilization
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through the devices that make civilization possible. Past developments have
been geared to adapting energy to do useful work. Devices ranging from
levers and pulleys to internal combustion engines, electrical generating
systems and steam engines operate on the principle of exploitation of
controlled energy. It is during those occasions when energy becomes
uncontrolled that accidents happen. Inherent in every energy-based system
is a hazard, the threat of an accident, a means whereby it can inflict damage.
Other situations and conditions arise whose origins lie outside the
system but, nevertheless, inflict damage upon it. These may arise from
material causes, or induced causes, or they may be of such a nature that the
damage is not immediately discernible. That is to say, a time-dependency
factor is introduced that may very well delay damage recognition for hours or
even days.
In those cases of violent eruptions of uncontrolled energy, the rational-
ization of the energy-event relationship is readily apparent. Other unwanted
situations or conditions arise, however, that test the creditability of the
energy approach more rigorously. In the area of controls over critical
functions, the energy approach may well seem at first glance to be moot. If,
however, the premise is accepted that the control over a function requires the
expenditure of energy, an interdependency is defined that only requires verifi-
cation through application. Two conditions are inherent in these considerations.
Framed more descriptively, they may perhaps be formalized as (1) potentially
destructive energy sources and (2) energy capability needs. The first group is
conditioned by the term "potential," reflecting the fact that any system containing
concentrated energy possesses the potential for inflicting destruction under
certain circumstances. The second group recognizes that energy is required
to perform work, which is basic to the physics of mechanics. Considering
work as a function, energy capability is needed to perform a function. If the
function is denied its normal energy requirements or if an excess demand
occurs by any one or a combination of several mechanisms, the function will
not be performed. Thus, if the needed energy is not met and the function is
not performed, a hazard to the safety of the system is in being.
If, for example, the braking system of an automobile fails through the
loss of hydraulic fluid, a safety-critical function is lost. Careful consideration
of such a situation will reveal that the absence of the means to transmit energy
to the brake shoes results in the loss of the braking function. This condition
could result from blockage of the hydraulic lines, failure of the mechanical
links, freezing of the hydraulic pistons, leakage of the hydraulic fluid, etc.
As will be discussed later, these causes are classed as mechanisms that
activate the hazard. As another example, failure of a steering mechanism
due to a disruption of the means to transmit torsional force to the wheel
assemblies results in loss of the directional steering function. Again, a
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surge of electrical current to a circuit breaker has on occasion welded
contact points and prevented the electrical mechanism from functioning.
These and many other similar events indicate an area of concern in which
accidents have occurred because of a deficiency or an oversupply of energy
disrupting a critical function.
Careful consideration therefore, allows a generalization of the part
energy assumes in accident systems; first, in its uncontrolled and destructive
release, and second, in its role relative to safety-critical functions (Fig. i).
Acceptance of these two principal hazard-energy interdependencies is
the key factor in developing a classification system in the detail necessary to
permit practicable use as an analytical tool for identifying hazards. Consider-
ing those situations in which discernible destruction occurs leads to the
realization that the energy originates from sources within the destroyed object
or conversely from sources outside the destroyed object. In addition,
destruction can take place in a nonviolent manner at a rather measured pace
suggesting minor, though important, energy activities. Collecting these
considerations into a formalized statement leads to the establishment of three
subgroupings involving the release of destructive energy: (1) High-Energy
Environments (sources originating outside the object), (2) High-Energy
Components (sources originating inside the object), and (3) Low-Energy
Phenomena (sources of low order reactivity). It should be noted that (1) and
(2) are potentially destructive to all life and property while (3) is potentially
destructive only to a sensitive receiver. The laser illustrates these two
degrees of potential destruction; the high-energy version projects a beam that
will burn everything in its path. The low-energy version projects a beam that
is potentially destructive only to a highly sensitive component, which is
normally the retina of the eye.
The other major division concerns itself with the disruptions to safety-
critical functions by the overabundance or underabundance of energy and has
been so designated.
Constraints
Using the hazard identification categories for identifying energy sources
and deprivation/release mechanisms is a rather clear-cut process when dealing
in specifics. A class of constraints does exist, and has been encountered,
that is so generalized as to constitute policies. The preponderance of these
constraints lend themselves very well to inclusion under hazard identification
category 1.0 (Table 1), but others may be encountered which seem more
applicable to inclusion within either hazard identification categories 2.0, 3.0,
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ALL HAZARDS INVOLVE ENERGY
ENERGY REQUIRED DESTRUCTIVE ENERGY
RELEASED
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SYSTEMS CONTROL
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Figure 1. The energy approach to hazard categorization.
TABLE I. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION INDEXING SYSTEM
1.0 Critical Energy Needs 2.2.4 Projectiles (Meteoriods, Windborne Objects)
i. i Physical Energy Needs 2.2.5 Temperature ('Thermal)
i. i. 1 Warning/Abort/Escape 2.2.6 Earthquake
1.1.2 Motion Control 2.2.7 Salt Spray
1. 1. 3 Information/Command 2.2.8 Pressure/Vacuum
1.1.4 Interface Capability
1. 2 Physiological Energy Needs 3.0 High Energy Components
1. 2. 1 Human Survival 3. i1 Potential Energy
1. 2.2 Human Capability 3.2 Kinetic Energy
3.3 Chemical Energy
2.0 High Energy Environments 3.4 Nuclear Energy
2. 1 Systems-Generated Environments
2. 1. 1 Dynamic Loads 4.0 Low Energy Phenomena
2. 1.1. . 1 Acceleration Loads 4. 1 Toxicants
2. 1. 1. 2 Vibrations 4. 1. 1 Inhalant
2. 1. 1.3 Acoustical 4. 1.2 Ingesta
2. 1. 1. 4 Pressure/Vacuum 4. 1. 3 Radiation
2. 1. 2 Static (Structural) Loads 4. 1. 4 Absorption (Dermal)
2.1.2.1 Shear
2.1.2.2 Tension 4.2 Physical Deterioration
2.1.2.3 Compression 4.2.1 Corrosion
2.1.3 Thermal 4.2.2 Embrittlement
2. 1.4 Electrical/Electronic 4.2.3 Aging
2.2 Natural Environments 4.3 Physical Contamination
2.2. 1 Lightning 4.3. 1 Surfaces
2.2.2 Wind 4.3.2 Orifices
2.2.3 Rain (Humidity) 4.3.3 Filters
or, perhaps, 4.0. Each individual case will require its own determination.
An example of this situation is the "destruct-system" which may also be
considered as a function. In the event the "destruct-function" is constrained,
hazard identification category 1.1 should be used for cataloging purposes. If,
however, the "destruct-system" is to be contrained, hazard identification
category 3.3 should be used. A reasonable approach to such a situation,
ensuring retrieval of the constraint, is to include it under one category and
reference it under the other. The objectives sought by this system should not
be submerged within the mechanics of the system itself. The distinction
enumerated above is, therefore, not intended to confuse those using this
system but to clarify a situation already encountered and suggest standardized
treatment for the sake of consistency.
General policy constraints are, as indicated previously, of a different
nature than are specific constraints of specific subjects. The latter quite
readily lend themselves to adoption to hazard analysis techniques while the
application of the former to hazard analysis may not be so apparent. It is
believed that the general policy constraint is more readily useable in conjunc-
tion with Fault Tree Analysis techniques. Using Fault Tree rationale permits
transmutation of general constraints into specific requirements suitable for
inclusion in specifications and procedures.
Additionally, it is recognized that a class of hazards exists that is
functional with time, and can be identified through a Time Line Analysis;
e.g., the venting of an experimental module that occurs at stated intervals
presents a potential gaseous product hazard in the experiment compartment
only during that period of venting, otherwise the module is benign insofar as
vented gases are concerned. There are many other situations ranging from
extravehicular activities (EVA) to transonic (aerodynamic) loading that
introduce time-dependent hazards. Using Fault Tree and Time Line Analysis
methods, when related to energy-based considerations, offers a very
practicable method for exposing those classes of hazards.
As mentioned previously, the unique steps associated with this identifi-
cation system originate with identification of the energy involvement, proceed
to exposing the release mechanism, and then cite control (checklist items)
entries that disrupt the potential disastrous interrelationship between the
source and the catalyzing mechanism.
Fault Tree and Time Line Analyses are overviews of approach in using
general policy and time-dependent constraints for hazard identification.
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SECTION IV. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM
The four categories of energy relations to hazards that lead to accidents
are used to structure - categorize and classify safety checklists. The check-
list principle itself is the tool by which experience gained from past activities
is retained and extrapolated as a guide toward achieving a high degree of
confidence that past mistakes are not repeated. It is important to understand
that the contents of checklists do not of themselves ensure full fault-free hard-
ware, nor do they replace design judgement in arriving at solutions to
engineering problems, any more than a cockpit checklist instructs a pilot how
to fly an airplane or a grocery list produces a cook. Designers work every
day unaided by checklists, and unless they can appreciate the assistance such
a tool offers, they will continue to do so. Thus, checklists must supplement
and improve normal capabilities to be effective. In order to achieve the goal
of making checklists useful and useable, they have been adapted to the hazards
identification system based upon energy considerations. The basic problem
in achieving such a marriage of convenience has been relating hazard identifi-
cation (basically a physics process) to hazards control (basically an engineer-
ing process) .
The following description, therefore, develops more fully the four
categories of hazards identified through energy considerations as well as the
system by which they adapt to engineering usage through checklists.
A. Critical Energy Needs
Energy relationships bound up in accident systems must be pursued
definitively along the two general classes discussed previously. It will be
recalled that the first of these classes deals with situations in which a
controlled expenditure of energy is necessary. Dealing exclusively with this
situation, it becomes increasingly apparent that controlled energy utilization
is essential to the operability and even to the survival of energy-based systems.
On the other hand, uncontrolled energy is destructive. In order to proceed
upon this thesis, it is necessary to define systems possessing critical energy
needs. Indeed, a little reflection will suggest that all dynamic systems and
even static systems possess, in one form or another, the need for energy.
In static systems, energy is required to maintain equilibrium; in dynamic
systems, energy is required to function. Thus the classification system
should be inclusive, and for that purpose advantage may be taken of the classic
boundaries separating the inanimate and the animate, the inorganic and the
organic, and man and his creations. These have been cast as "physical"' and
"physiological" systems (Table 1).
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Before entering upon an examination of the components of these two
all-encompassing categories, it should be mentioned that in applying energy
concepts, two basic considerations predominate: (i) those in which demands
exceed normal capabilities, and (2) those in which an inability to meet normal
demands is encountered traceable to a deterioration of the energy supply.
These two basic considerations may serve as guidelines in pondering hazards
arising from critical energy needs in either physical or physiological systems.
Turning first to the "physical" group comprising those inanimate static
and dynamic systems, four inclusive areas of concern have been identified.
These functional areas are: (1) warning, abort, and escape; (2) motion
control; (3) information and command; and (4) interface capability.
The first of these functional areas deals with systems used to warn
or alert personnel that an undesired event is impending. This may or may
not presuppose that sufficient time is available to prevent the event from taking
place, but it does presuppose that personnel can escape from its effects. For
example, a blinker light placed before a highway construction project can warn
the motorist of changed road conditions which may very well be hazardous.
At high rates of speed, he may be unable to respond to the warning and crash
through the barrier, run into broken pavement, etc.; however, at reasonable
speeds, he may stop, detour, slow down, or take action so as to prevent an
accident from happening. Again, in the early years of coal mining, miners
carried caged canaries into the tunnels to warn them of unsafe atmospheres.
The death of the canary warned the miners to leave the area immediately. In
these examples, the conditions that could lead to accidents are not removed,
but the conditions are advertised so as to facilitate escape from their potential
effects. In other cases, alarms and sensors may be used to alert personnel
of fires, allowing them adequate time to escape, not necessarily adequate
time to extinguish the fire. On the other hand, an alarm on an aircraft
indicating engine fire alerts the pilot to the danger so he may take action to
save the passengers from mishap. Warning devices are therefore mechanisms
used to alert interested parties of hazards to safety as well as dangerous
conditions leading to preventive action or timely escape from its effects.
The means for escape should also be provided. Escape systems in
their broadest concept range from simple structural devices, such as fire
ladders, to the more sophisticated Apollo Launch Escape System (LES).
Abort systems are devices which permit cutting off or breaking off an
action, operation, or procedure. In this context, the braking system of an
automobile is an abort system in that it provides the means for cutting off the
velocity of an automobile.
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These three areas are closely related in that they provide the means
to alert or warn of impending dangerous conditions, provide the means for
breaking off the activities, and the means for escaping the consequences. The
use of systems to make these actions possible should be a matter of policy.
Motion control is another function requiring energy, and varies in
concept from attitude control of a spacecraft to steering of an automobile. In
the latter case, steering an automobile is rather simple under normal driving
conditions since the driver is aware of his relative position and where he
wishes to go as well as how to get there. In space, steering requires use of a
complex coordinate system and equipment to indicate position within that
system. Thus, attitude control and steering become vital equipment functions
requiring controlled energy. Its area of applicability encompasses the entire
mission from lift-off to reentry and landing when applied to space operations.
Information and command are functions closely allied with motion
control. Information can be derived from instrumentation systems which
measure temperature, pressure, flow rates, acceleration, and vibrations.
It can also be secured from the flight crews investigating conditions indicated
by telemetry. Aircraft leaving and arriving at modern airfields are controlled
and operated through information received from the control tower or associated
ground radar stations. Command of vehicles, whether space vehicles or.
terrestrial vehicles, is exercised by using relevant information of conditions
(either external or internal), making decisions, and taking action. The
important aspect of this relationship is that the information must be available,
timely, understandable, and correct to facilitate execution of the proper com-
mand which, in turn, allows proper control of critical functions.
Interface capability reflects concern of the effects one system or its
byproducts may have on another or on the entire assembly. Outgassing of a
modular payload venting onto other vehicular compartments may cause loss of
life if toxics are released, or explosion if reactive gases are released, or
serious corrosion of vital parts if corrosive gases are released.
The human, his survival, and preservation of his capability has been of
paramount concern to the safety specialist and indeed has prompted a consider-
able number of laws passed by Congress, the latest of which is the O.S.H.A.
act of 1970. A considerable amount of effort has been expended in all areas
of society by both the government and the private sector to eliminate conditions
that tend to destroy or limit human life, human health, and human capabilities
(mental, physical, and sensory). Quite obviously, human life, health, and
capabilities are closely entwined, but in this context, human capabilities are
taken to mean those capabilities compromised by other than disease, for a
human can remain healthy after losing an eye or a limb, but his physical
capability is impaired.
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Thus, such things as safety glasses, steel-toed shoes, hard hats, and
other articles of protective clothing are designed to preserve physical capabili-
ties by preventing or mitigating the degree of injury to the protected parts.
On the other hand, sound controlled to acceptable levels not only preserves
human hearing (sensory), but may very well preserve his decision-making
(mental) capabilities.
In the space program, the concern for human survival is specifically
cited in the presidential directive establishing the Apollo Program. Thus,
considerable effort has been directed toward ensuring crew survival through
supplying critical needs for life support.
Providing for the maintenance of human capability in the space environ-
ment has been a much more complex undertaking since the effects of the
environment upon the ability of the crew to function have been included in the
mission plans to test and establish the boundaries of man's functional capabili-
ties.
The lessons learned from man-in-space operations, his critical life-
support needs, and his capabilities form the bulk of experience that should be
reduced to checklist form to ensure carryover for future guidance in planning
and conducting programs in which man participates.
Returning to the methodology as indicated by the index shown in Table
i, it is unique to this system that an energy loss/excess demand mechanism
be identified and present for transposition of the hazard into an undesired
event (Fig. 2). Again, three general situations have been used to categorize
the types of mechanisms that can activate an accident. They are either unsafe
acts, unsafe conditions, or a combination of the two. Unsafe conditions are
considered as originating from either design errors or manufacturing faults,
while unsafe acts originate from either faulty procedures/practices or from
deficiencies in supervisory activity. The identification of the disabling
mechanism and its proper categorization as either an act or condition completes
hazard identification analysis. Additionally, it is the fundamental factor in
developing hazard control measures as checklist items.
Unsafe conditions arising during either design or manufacturing
operations are carried forward into the categorization of checklists under
eight principal areas in which control may be reasonably expected to be
effective (Fig. 3). In this case they are classed as: (1) configuration
(safety margins), (2) materials selection, (3) protection or warning devices,(4) interface requirements, (5) fabrication processes or tooling, (6) training
and certification, (7) assembly or installation, and (8) inspection or test
operations, respectively.
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Figure 2. Hazard identification system.
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Figure 3. Systematic arrangement of hazards catalogue.
Unsafe acts arising from procedural faults or supervisory deficiencies
are carried forward into the categorization of checklists under eight major
categorizations: (I) procedure documentation, (2) training and certification,
(3) checkout, (4) maintenance and repair, (5) operations, (6) employee
selection, (7) employee motivation, and (8) employee surveillance, respectively.
Pertinent control factors, principally in the form of interrogatives,
constitute items of the checklist. Cataloging these items under the headings
listed above - a total of 15 - only serves as an organizational structure to
prompt consideration of all facets that may reasonably be expected to separate
or eliminate the disabling mechanism from the source of the hazard identified
during analysis.
This rather long explanation has been inserted at this point since it is
common to the two major categories of hazards arising from (1) a destructive
energy source, or (2) critical energy needs leading to the loss of critical
functions. The following paragraphs dealing with the identification of destruc-
tive energy sources will, in the case of "controls" or checklist items, follow
the same pattern as followed by those identifying "controls" for "critical
energy needs."
B. Destructive Energy Groups
The second grouping under the hazards identification system consists
of situations in which destructive energy sources are released, inflicting
direct injury or damage. This grouping consists of (1) high energy environ-
ments, (2) high energy components, and (3) low energy phenomena.
To repeat again for emphasis, (1) and (2) are potentially destructive
to all life and property while low energy hazards, (3), are potentially
destructive only to a sensitive energy receiver.
1. High Energy Environments. As previously mentioned, high energy
environments consist of those environments induced by the systems and of
those attributable to nature. Environments that constitute hazards induced by
the systems include acceleration, vibration, noise, temperature, electrical
phenomena, pressure, and its antithesis, vacuum. Some examples are
launch shock, flutter, engine noise, exhaust flame, capacitor failure, and
tank implosion.
Natural environments are lightning, wind, projectiles, temperature,
earthquake, pressure, and, again, vacuum. These hazards can create condi-
tions such as stress fracture, fatigue fracture, distortion, electrocution,
displacement, fire, and collision.
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2. High Energy Components. The high energy component category is
self-descriptive since it deals with components that contain, and hence can
inadvertently release, high energy. In this case, the energy itself consists
of potential, kinetic, chemical, and nuclear energy. YThese energy sources
may be immediately recognizable as basic physical energy classes. Reposi-
tories of these energies are pressure vessels, moving automobiles, explosives
(conventional), and nuclear bombs. Accidents (catastrophic events) that can
result from the release of these energies are explosion, fire, collision,
electrocution, and structural destruction.
3. Low Energy Phenomena. Low energy phenomena has been defined
as consisting of three sources of hazardous energy:
i. Human toxics introduced into human systems through inhalation,
ingestion, radiation, and skin damage. Examples of sources of
this type of energy are combustion products, mercury droplets,
laser beams, and acid burns.
2. Material deterioration, whose energy becomes identifiable
through physical phenomena such as corrosion, embrittlement,
and aging catalyzed by exposure to salt spray, hydrogen
occlusion in steel, and biological phenomena such as fungus
and termites.
3. Physical contamination lends itself to the low energy phenomena
category through the idea that, for example, in the case of
contaminated optical lens, energy prohibition is introduced
through the obstruction of light rays passing through the lens
to the focal points. Another association of physical contamination
with energy is through the idea that it requires energy to locate
the contaminant in a position to produce harmful effects. In
still another case of, for example, hydrocarbon contamination
of a LOX valve, unwanted energy is added to the system.
Additional examples are the results of contamination appearing
on surfaces or in fluids/gases and include health damage, orifice
(flow) blockage, electrical damage, and bearing seizure.
Physical contamination has been included under this headline
rather than under functions, since contamination is an
identifiable hazard directly associated with hardware rather
than a function.
For these three classes of "destructive energy", an energy change
must be initiated to initiate a chain of circumstances that leads to an accident.
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This energizer has been termed an "energy release" or "transfer mechanism,"
identical in concept to the disabling mechanism previously discussed. (Fig. 2).
Again, as previously mentioned, this energizing mechanism is activated by
either unsafe acts or unsafe conditions. This identification scheme is the point
of commonality in hazard identification of the two major categories of hazard
identification. The "control" phase is also identical to the one previously
described.
Observing Figure 2 will perhaps more clearly illustrate the logic of the
preceding discussion. In addition, it should be noted that the chain of informa-
tion leading to hazard identification is based primarily on the physical chemis-
try or other sciences of the functions/hardware under analysis, while the
"unsafe acts/unsafe conditions" as well as control concepts (checklist items)
are primarily based on applied science and engineering.
C. Relationship to Existing Analytical Techniques
The basic concept of the energy-based system for hazards identification
lies in the definitive definition of the dual elements of the identification process.
If either of these elements is missing, then by definition a hazard does not
exist. The concept may be expressed as a "lock and key" system; both are
required for functional integrity. It is this definition of the established rela-
tionship between energy and its catalytic features that creates the opportunity
for integration of all existing analytical safety methodologies within one doc-
trinaire regime. This consolidation has many advantages, but its principal
advantage lies in forming a common frame of reference throughout the disci-
pline of safety. A common frame of reference in turn opens the way for bring-
ing all divergent safety analyses and their results into a single format which
facilitates the exchange, retention, and accumulation of pertinent information
that is readily comprehended and is thus useable on.a wide range of programs
and activities. Experience and knowledge recorded in the disciplined manner
characteristic of the energy-based system will ultimately produce not only
appreciable direct savings but indirect savings in allowing insights into past
problems and their resolutions, thereby avoiding costly and marginal false
starts leading to catastrophic conclusions.
In the practical vein, the question quite naturally centers on just how
can the energy sources and needs be determined and how can the release and
deprivation mechanisms be determined. These determinations can be made
(Fig. 4) by reviews of technical material in the first instance and by analytical
means in the second.
Reviews conducted to determine energy sources and energy needs must
consider those sources inherent in the design; that is, those internal to the
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Figure 4. Hazard identification relationship of analytical techniques.
configuration as well as those external sources. Technical documentation, i.e.,
drawings, specifications, schematics, and layouts, will contain information
concerning internal energy sources as well as energy needs. The external
sources are possibly more difficult to clearly identify. This case necessitates
a thorough knowledge and understanding of the operational features of the
design and the medium or environment in which or through which it is planned
to move. These may vary considerably from energies associated with aero-
dynamic characteristics of sonic, supersonic, or hypersonic velocities, to
surface conditions of roadways or waterways. In the latter case, for example,
icy road conditions may decrease the coefficient of friction sufficiently to
affect wheel traction and thereby deprive the vehicle of the energy necessary
to come to a standstill. The surfaces of waterways may become sufficiently
disturbed by waves, wakes, surface winds, etc., so as to prevent the mainte-
nance of stability necessary to the steering function of vessels. Again, as
mentioned previously, a time dependency factor may have to be considered;
for example, seasonal changes that influence movement or operations. The
external effects of cold, wet, hot, or dry external conditions present unique
repositories of energy sources and/or needs.
Thus reviews to identify external energy sources require a knowledge
of operations and a knowledge of when, where, and how they are to be carried
out.
The energy release and energy deprivation mechanisms (Fig. 4) can
be identified by the use of currently available analytical tools, such as the
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis, Logic Diagramming, Sneak Circuit Analy-
sis, etc. These tools are generally well known and currently in use. Per-
formed within the context and under the guidelines of the energy-based doctrine
they will all contribute similar results even though the techniques vary.
It is not intended that the energy-based doctrine of hazards identifica-
tion be considered as another of a growing number of methods and techniques
available to identify hazards to safety. Rather it should be considered as the
system by which all safety analyses techniques can be assembled into an
intelligible vehicle by which safety activity can be initiated and carried forward
in a milieu of common understanding.
SECTION V. INTEGRATION INTO THE DEVELOPMENT CYCLE
It is useful to consider development programs in terms of "inputs" and
"outputs". In considering how safety and safety requirements are integrated
into developments, an interpretation through these two functions may illustrate
a satisfactory technique.
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The output of a research and development (R & D) program can be
envisioned as being in the form of a flow of instructions, each new set of
instructions specifying inputs and operations to be performed in them, which
will result in a new product of specified attributes. The instructions may be
thought of (from the safety point of view) as checklists, itemizing things to
do in order to avoid hazards. They relate to the design, development, and
operational phases of a new product function. The payoff to the program is the
net value of being able to employ these new products, confident that a pre-
ponderance of known hazards have been dealt with.
The principal inputs to an R&D program are specialized and trained
direct labor (in particular, scientists and engineers); a technical and
managerial support staff; equipment and materials used to run experiments,
to build and test parts of the whole of the product under development; and
various facility items. As implied, the principal safety input is through the
efforts of the specialized and trained personnel. It becomes evident, therefore,
that steps must be taken to support and augment the levels of experience
reposited in those personnel. One technique to accomplish this is through the
use of checklists tailored to satisfy their needs in accomplishing safety tasks
characteristic of the progress and degree of completion of the development.
Since differing tasks and differing concerns are characteristic of the degree
of development progress, the necessity of timeliness is quite apparent.
A review of the guideline program planning documentation under which'
Federal developments are structured clearly reflects this condition by identi-
fying four characteristic phases of R&D programs. Sufficient flexibility has
been introduced to allow adoption of the checklist principle at any phase,
depending upon the situation encountered. The development phases have been
designated as Phase A (concept), Phase B (definition), Phase C (engineering
development) and Phase D (operations). A review of the "products" of each
of these phases suggests a rough separation between generation of design
requirements and generation of design solutions. The first two phases (A and
B) are identifiable within the former separation (functional baseline), and the
latter phases (C and D) generally align with the (design-to-make-to) products
separation. More formally, Phases A and B produce information that is
compiled and published as a functional baseline in the form of a program
specification. Phases C and D produce a design requirements baseline
contained in a Contract End Item Part I Specification and a product configura-
tion baseline contained in a Contract End Item Part II Specification. These
phases also produce the experimental hardware that is assembled, tested, and
used in accomplishing, demonstrating, designing, engineering, fabricating and
operating integrity.
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If the energy approach to hazard identification is viewed in the same
context, it will be noted that the four groups previously described align them-
selves into functional and hardware-related categories (Fig. 5). The High
Energy Environment category may be considered as transitional since natural
environments can be described in nonhardware terms, while their effects act
directly on hardware and may thus influence design or selection of systems,
subsystems, or components. Hazards associated with functions can be identi-
fied by functional analysis quite independent of hardware considerations and
thus category 1.0 is relatable to development activities carried out during
Phases A and B. As previously mentioned, Phases C and D are hardware
related, as are checklist items included in 3.0 and 4.0. Category 2.0 repre-
sents a transitional mixture, as previously mentioned, and is thus related to
both the "paper" and "hardware" groups.
This suggested alignment of the hazard identification categories and
the phases of the Phased Program Development Plan does not imply that these
categorized checklists are unique to or can only be used during the development
phases indicated, but does indicate where their primary relevance lies. Thus,
in early phases when the functions are generally identifiable with particular
concepts, those general checklist items cataloged under 1.0 will be found to be
of more intrinsic value in hazard identification analysis than perhaps a check-
list dealing with a specific component or system. Those checklists concerned
primarily with systems, subsystems, and components find their most relevant
application to those phases of development where actual designs are converted
into experimental hardware. It is believed therefore, that by matching the
categories of the hazard identification systems, checklists with the phase of
development and integration of subject matter will result from which maximum
benefit will occur.
Quite obviously monitoring and controlling safety hazards elimination
effort through audits and analyses of work in progress lends itself very well
to this systematic approach, highlighting areas of concern and increasing
confidence that those areas already considered are adequately treated. Figure
2 shows the transition from "Hazard Identification" checklists to "Hazard
Control" checklists. The latter list can be used to generate design criteria
for inclusion in the allocated baseline and also for checking compliance of the
product baseline and the hardware with these criteria.
SECTION VI. FORMS FOR RECORDING INFORMATION
The following describes two basic forms on which hazard identification
and control information will be recorded.
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Figure 5. Integration of development phases with hazard identification categories.
A. Checklist Forms for Safety Critical Systems Functions
A checklist form has been devised (Fig. 6) to collect relevant informa-
tion for systematic cataloging. Examination of this form reveals, following
identifying headings, two major divisions - hazard identification and hazard
control. These two functions have been separated so as to aid a safety analyst
or practicing engineer in first identifying the hazard and then reviewing the
list of requirements aimed at prohibiting the hazard from occurring.
The hazard identification column has been separated into two groups:
(i) the hazardous energy source and the controlled energy need and (2) the
energy release mechanism/control disabling mechanism. For the purposes of
identification, a hazard in each column may be identified as the hazard
triggered by either an energy release mechanism or a control disabling
mechanism.
The second major division provides space for recording the hazard
control (checklist) items under either component critical/procedural
constraints or control critical/procedural constraints.
The initial listing of hazards identification and hazards control items
is by no means complete. Rather, hazards cataloging is a continuing process
of adding, deleting, and refining items on each list.
B. Checklist Forms for Destructive Energy Classes
The remaining three classes of hazards, high energy environments,
high energy components, and low energy phenomena, are recorded on a
second form (Fig. 7). Again, it will be noted that the form is divided into
two major sections; hazard identification and hazard control. It should be
noted that unlike the previous form, hazard identification consists of two major
sections - energy sources and energy release/transfer mechanisms, the
latter relatable to the disabling mechanism previously mentioned. Following
the same pattern as employed earlier, the hazard class will be entered on the
form together with its energy source and its release/transfer mechanism
followed by hazards control requirements. As a further aid to potential users,
the systems, subsystems, and/or components subject to the hazards are also
shown on the form. In this case, the hazards control requirements, the check-
list items, "are cataloged under four major headings: (1) Configuration
Design Criteria, (2) Manufacturing Process Criteria, (3) Product Use
Procedure Criteria, and (4) Supervision. The completed forms are then
filed by system or component to which they are related as a matter of conven-
ience to the user.
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Figure 6. Critical energy needs.
CLASSIFICATION ; SYSTEM/COMPONENT
REFERENCE: DATE
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION HAZARD CONTROL
ENERGY SOURCE RELEASE/TRANISMER SPECIFICATION/PROCEDURAL CONSTRAINTS
S&AR-36.OT-73
Figure 7. Hazard identification and control checklist.
SECTION VII. INDEXING
The indexing system used is the standard numerical type (Table i).
This system will be consistent throughout; thus, 2.0 will always be high
energy sources and 2.1 will always be system environments.
SECTION VIII. SAFETY POLICIES
In any development program specific hazard identification and control
activities may be guided by constraints that are so general that they amount to
policy statements rather than design criteria. For example, a decision to
require an ejection escape device for a pilot may be considered either as a
development policy or as a checklist item.
SECTION IX. EXAMPLES
Perhaps an example of each of the two major categories of hazards
will serve to clarify how the system .of classification works out in practice.
A. Critical Energy Needs
Example - Guard crewman against excessive radiation from experi-
ment equipment.
Explanation - A cursory review of this requirement indicates that it is
not concerned with specific hardware other than the general category of experi-
ment equipment that presumably contains a source of radiation. It is, in
fact, a statement of general policy; thus it becomes relevant to the first
category of the classification system, 1.0, Critical Energy Needs. In this
context it is the goal to preserve the critical human functions by preventing
their deterioration through overdoses of radiation which will ultimately lead
to death or to serious impairment of human functional systems. Viewed through
another light, it may be argued that by preventing radiation overdoses, the
system control of the human being is preserved, since any severe deterioration
or loss of human systems represents a loss of control of that system, which,
in its extreme case, is represented by death.
At any rate, this requirement, as stated, may be logically cataloged
as Class 1.0.
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Entries on the Form - Turning now to the form (Fig. 6), the first
entry, "Classification", should be "Physiological Systems". The date and the
references from which the entry originates may be entered as a matter of
convenience as well as a source of future information.
The next entries should deal with hazard identification and in the first
column the entry "Life Support Human Capability" should be made. This is
the control energy need; i.e., to preserve human life and human capability.
The second entry defines the Energy Loss/Excess Demand Mechanism.
In this case, the disabling mechanism is "Nuclear Radiation", which would
seem sufficiently descriptive to indicate the hazard. With this second entry,
"Hazard Identification" is complete.
First, the human crewman has been identified as the subject for which
controlled energy (radiation) is needed and secondly, the disabling mechanism
(radiation) or perhaps rephrased as energy (radiation) buildup to unacceptable
proportions within human systems. The disabling mechanism is the actual
buildup or retention by the human systems of radiation doses together with its
biological/biochemical reactions commencing when critical levels are reached.
If radiation dosage was not cumulative and harmlessly dissipated as fast as it
impinged upon the human systems, there would be no disabling mechanism.
It should be the objective of those making entries on these forms to be as brief
as possible, thus the notation "Nuclear Radiation" would appear to be sufficient-
ly descriptive.
The last column, entitled "Component Critical/Procedural Constraints
and Control Critical/Procedural Constraints" is reserved for the requirement
(checklist item) for hazard control.
In the example cited, the entry under "Control Critical/Procedural
Constraint" may take the form: "Provide crew protection against excessive
radiation doses from experiment equipment. "
As a note of clarity, if a specific piece of hardware containing a
radiation source was under consideration, such as a SNAP series of reactors,
then the entry would be in the Preliminary Component Hazard Identification
Series (Fig. 2), cataloged under 4.0 Low Energy Phenomena, 4.1.3 Radiation,
with specific requirements entered under the Hazards Control column suitable
for inclusion in specifications and/or procedures.
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B. Destructive Energy Related Forms (Fig. 7)
Example - Battery explosion caused by collection of hydrogen gas
from battery operations.
Entries on the Form - The energy-related form contains an entry
for classification of the hazard under consideration: In this case, the hazard
was an exploding battery, and a battery is a high energy component. Thus,
the classification will be entered as "3.0 High Energy Component. " The next
entry, "System/Subsystem/Component ", is, obviously, "Batteries". For
convenience as well as for future reference, the source of the information may
be cited as well as the associated date.
The body of the form now requires an entry, first, in the left hand
column the energy source should be cited. In our example, the energy source
is clearly chemical, 3.3 in our indexing system. The next column is headed
"Release/Transfer Mechanism". There are two situations that can release
or transfer energy; either acts or conditions. "Acts" refer to two situations
in which the human acts as the accident trigger through either deficient
procedural controls or human error. "Conditions" refer to either an inherent
design originated hazard or an error in manufacturing. In this example, an
"act" is not applicable since the mere collection of hydrogen gas is not an act
within the context of this classification system. The absence of a venting
system leading to the collection of hydrogen gas was a design error, thus it is
cataloged as a "condition". Consequently, within the second column under the
subtitle of "conditions", an entry will be made citing the proximity of the
ignition source and the energy source. If they were separated, an explosion
would not occur. Completion of this entry will then complete the "Hazard
Identification. " The energy source has been identified as well as the trigger-
ing mechanism.
The third column, "Hazard Control", should contain an entry aimed at
eliminating the identified hazard.
Four divisions of hazard controls have been identified in this system as
described previously. In this example, control of the identified hazard
requires venting of storage batteries to prevent collections of hydrogen gas,
which is a design rather than a procedural requirement. Thus, the hazard
control will be cited under "Configuration Design Criteria,". This entry does
not specify how batteries will be vented or the disposition of vented gases; that
is, the engineering problem confronting the designers. The entry only states
that venting will be required in appropriate specifications, and the checklist
item only reminds safety engineers as well as design engineers and specifica-
tion writers that batteries should be vented.
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C. Analysis of Functional Areas
The preceding two illustrations delt with a specific phenomenon (atomic
radiation) and with a specific component (batteries). These are limiting situa-
tions and find limited use, especially in early program phases when general
concepts and broad guideline plans are of primary concern. Among the basic
concerns of preliminary and advanced planners are the nature and scope of
potential problems associated with the various schemes under consideration.
Foremost among potential problems are, quite naturally, those concerning
safety of the equipment as well as the safety of people. The energy-based
technique can be structured to deal with these types of situations. The area
of transportation has been selected to support this claim.
Example: Transportation Operations - Moving commodities from their
point of origin to their point of utilization is vital to business success in both
the private and the public sector of the economy. In the private sector it forms
part of the distribution system intended to reach extensive markets with com-
petitive products. Access to markets forms the basis for a free enterprise
economy that is itself a marketing and distributing system. A method of
transportation that delivers commodities inexpensively, safely, and swiftly
to market is quite obviously a necessary and vital part of that system.
In the public sector emphasis is somewhat altered to the extent that
the distribution system is restrictive. Excepting special cases, such as the
military requiring continual resupply, the preponderance of distributions are
on a "case-by-case" basis. Operations are carried out to satisfy requirements
of a single or specific job following which they are discontinued. Additionally,
costs are rather secondary, giving way to schedules and safety considerations.
This is true since "deliverable value" is not a fiscal but a functional measure.
Both systems possess certain underlying similarities, however, which
are based primarily on schedule considerations and on product safety. The
commodity to be either economically rewarding or functionally useful must be
delivered in useable condition - that is, safely. For this to be accomplished,
it - the commodity - must be protected from damage arising from conditions
encountered during movement.
For such protection to be effective, it is necessary to anticipate and
guard against conditions that could prove damaging. That is, hazards to the
commodity in the form of unsafe acts or unsafe conditions must be identified.
The broad and most obvious hazards are readily identifiable and, as
such, are seldom experienced since protective measures negate their effects
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upon the commodity. It is the unexpected and not quite so obvious hazard that
escapes identification and results in damage to the commodity.
It is necessary, therefore, to afford protection to commodities from
all hazards, the obvious as well as the not so obvious, during transportation
operations and, to do that, comprehensive measures embodying methodical
identification must be adopted. An array of complex and interacting conditions
keyed to commodity characteristics and ranging from peculiarities in the mode
of handling, of packaging, and of stowage practices and in procedures must be
identified and diagnosed for hazardous considerations. Contributing factors
must be assessed, and reasonable protective measures must be adopted to
ensure damage free delivery. During initial planning, hazards identification
relies principally on predictions of anticipated conditions and their effects.
Forecasting probable future events of this nature suggests employment of
subjective as well as comparative approaches to problem resolutions. The
subjective approach relies on personal experience transferred from previous
relevant jobs. All predictions recognize an element of subjective judgment,
and personal skill must, therefore, play a part in the effort to identify hazards.
However, hazard identification operations that are wholly subjective are of
limited value since they are based on the recollections of which the individual
involved has personal experience and, consequently, do not allow adequately
for other experience which may be revelant. As is generally recognized,
personal recollections are not entirely reliable.
Comparative methods are based on detailed records of.previous ex-
periences encountered in developments and may be used to make direct com-
parisons of past conditions with those anticipated, together with protective
measures previously adopted. In virtually any proposed development a number
of, in this case, transportation problems will correspond quite closely to
problems encountered during previous developments. The similarity analysis
of identified hazards is the citation of those actually experienced in the most
similar circumstances (after allowing for some changes because of commodity
differences, technology advances, etc.) and using this information as the esti-
mate for hazards to be expected in the program under study. The records
referred to are of a more practicable value when formulated as "checklists."
However, "checklists" that are random and undisciplined are of little value to
systematic study. Not only should checklists be compiled, maintained, and
updated, but they should be organized in a consistent and meaningful manner
to facilitate their use. Cataloging technique is one of the principal advantages
of the energy-based system for hazard identification. Beyond organization of
checklists, it is necessary to organize the area under study into manageable
segments as restrictive as practicable to ensure careful consideration of all
energy-based phenomena.
30
In the transportation area it may be useful to define transportation
operations for the purpose of hazard identification in broad terms, inclusive
of all potential influences upon the commodity. Transportation may be defined,
therefore, as the movement of commodities or products from one geographical
location to another, together with all supporting activities by four modes; air,
railway, water, and roadway.
Refinement into more manageable segments may be approached through
the use of a broad and simplified functional schematic of operations constituting
transportation. Thus, the operation may be considered as consisting of: (1)
loading the commodity on a carrier, (2) moving it to a destination, and (3)
off-loading the commodity. Such a basic treatment implies a number of ques-
tions that immediately suggest its inadequacies. How is the product contained?
Is it packaged? What equipment is used in loading, unloading, and stowage?
What are the characteristics of the commodity? What type of carrier is used,
and what route will it travel? Lastly it may be asked, by what process were
the carrier, the route, the packaging, the handling equipment, and the stowage
requirements determined? This last question suggests management involve-
ment in decision making which in turn suggests technical involvement in prob-
lem solving.
It would not be too difficult to argue a planning function to plan and
organize the activity, nor a design-engineering function to create the equipment
required to carry out.the activity, nor a manufacturing and testing function to
produce the equipment and demonstrate its capability in satisfying require-
ments. All of these activities precede the act of movement. The functional
schematic is not, therefore, representative of all influences upon commodity
movement nor does it meet the intent of the definition cited above.
A more inclusive approach may possibly be found in identifying all
activities, including managerial, technical, and operational, that constitute
the process of moving commodities safely. These are planning, design
engineering, manufacturing and testing, and operations and are the same
generalized functions that attend any engineering development activity.
These generalizations may be adopted to transportation questions by
identifying tasks that are to be performed. In planning (using the commodity
and its characteristics as an input), the mode, route, cost, and schedule
estimates are decided, and generalized instructions embodying those decisions
are issued to design engineering. In arriving at those general decisions, haz-
ards must be identified, trade-offs made, and safety considerations incorpora-
ted into the instructions issued to design engineering.
31
Adopting the energy-based concepts to hazard identification for trans-
portation systems studies in this initial phase will be limited to those condi-
tions expected to be met during functional activities (Fig. 8).
The mode itself suggests certain energy-based hazards arising from
both carrier-systems-generated environments and from natural environments.
Railway transport suggests system environments such as applied vibrations
from road beds and high shock from humping during train makeup at railway
yards.
In regard to natural environments, routes through areas adjacent to
and in sea atmospheres suggest salty atmospheric environments that may
lead to corrosion problems. Destination may even induce effects that threaten
or damage commodities. The Air Force, for example, air transported a
missile in a sealed container from its manufacturing site, geographically
located at a high elevation, to a base located at a lower elevation. The package
was opened and when the missile was withdrawn from the container, its tanks
collapsed. The collapse was the result of the pressure differential, the low
pressure of the manufacturing site coupled with the high ambient pressure at
the delivery site, acting upon the tanks.
Planning apparently failed to take into account the varying hazards
attendant to widespread military usage when developing general requirements
governing transportation operations. In this instance the energy source over-
looked was that arising from high energy natural environments, specifically
those posed by atmospheric pressure. The hazards experienced during ship-
ment were apparently provisioned since the packaged missile was delivered
undamaged, and if it had been opened at an elevation comparable to that of the
manufacturing site, no damage would have occurred. It is interesting to
speculate that if a comprehensive hazard identification procedure had been
available, would this particular hazard have been recognized and avoided?
Here we are quite obviously engaging in problematical speculation, but the
odds tend to favor hazard identification and avoidance when a methodical and
comprehensive identification procedure is used.
In the context of the energy-based identification system discussed in
this document, it may be of interest to answer the question identifying the
energy release mechanism. In this case, the mechanism was a "condition"
triggered by exposure to a high energy source (ambient atmospheric pressure).
The pressure differential thus created by the container design (low internal
tank pressure - high external atmospheric pressure) crushed the tanks. In a
more objective manner, it may be described as the outside pressure pushing
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Figure 8. Hazard identification planning chart - transportation.
against the lower internal pressure of the tank until an equilibrium point was
reached in which the differential across the tank walls was zero. In the process
of reaching equilibrium the metal walls were distorted to the point that they
were no longer useable.
This example illustrates two very important aspects of hazard identifi-
cation: (1) the need for a methodical and comprehensive identification pro-
cedure, and (2) its use early enough to have a decided influence upon planning
and design engineering.
In its application to the transportation problem, an energy-based
approach recognizes that each mode available for use presents various forms
and magnitudes of energies acting upon the carrier-commodity as a unit as well
as upon the commodity itself. These forms and magnitudes of energies gener-
ally arise from conditions imposed by the medium in which the carrier moves.
For example, conditions in air and water are quite different from those en-
countered on roadways. The effects of conditions are implicit throughout the
system influencing carrier design, package design, handling techniques, and
stowage techniques. It may be argued that these conditions primarily affect the
carrier and have only a secondary effect upon the commodity. This is true to
the extent that the commodity has been shielded from those effects as recipients
of broken mechandise are aware. In arriving at a definition of those provisions
necessary to shield the mechandise from damage, the conditions to which the
package is subjected throughout its movement including the effects transmitted
by the carrier must be identified and protective precautions must be taken. In
addition, conditions acting independently upon the commodity must be identified
and their damage potential assessed. These may include such conditions as
high or low temperatures, humidity, salty or corrosive atmospheres, pres-
sures, etc. A large number of the conditions that pose threats can be identified
during planning studies merely by considering the mode and route proposed in
light of the characteristics of the commodity. High pressure differentials will
always pose threats to thin wall tanks, high vibrations and shocks to fragile
material, salty atmospheres to untreated metal surfaces, and low temperatures
to elastomeric materials. The problem is compounded, but by no means in-
soluble, when qualitative relationships of combined environments are studied for
hazard potentials (Fig. 9).
Incorporation of the information, identifying hazards to be expected into
the general requirements issued by planning to design engineering, is of con-
siderable use in developing realistic specifications, drawings, and procedures
for transportation equipment. In our example, if the hazard arising from
pressure differentials had been cited in the general requirements issued by
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planning, design engineering could have incorporated a simple relief value in
the container design which would have eliminated the hazard.
SOURCE: TR-61-363W-PAFB AERO-SYSTEMS DIV. 1961
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Figure 9. Qualitative relationship of combined environments.
Design engineering, the second function previously mentioned, imple-
ments general requirements by producing design drawings, writing specifica-.tions, and procedures. Activity may range from such diverse items as
packages, containers, mountings, handling equipment, and carriers as well asmodifications to existing carriers. Hazard identification during this period
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should concern itself with the adequacy of protection afforded the commodity
from hazards identified during planning activity, providing requirements for
incorporation in specifications and procedures, and reviewing designs to
identify specific hazards introduced by specific designs. The procedure used
during planning, that is, identifying the energy source and identifying the
release mechanism, readily adopts itself to safety studies conducted during
this period.
Manufacturing is the function that translates designs and specifications
into tangible products, containers, shock and vibration mounts, protective
closures, and handling equipment used in transporting the commodity. Safety
operations should ensure that approved specifications and drawings are faith-
fully executed. Quite frequently design changes are necessitated by manufac-
turing considerations and it is important that such changes do not introduce new
or additional hazards. Also, it is important that such changes as are intro-
duced are reviewed and that such changes as are adopted are adequately treated
in procedural documents.
Testing may or may not be performed to establish design and manufac-
turing acceptability of the final product. In so far as transportation equipment
itself is concerned, testing demonstrates for the designer as well as for safety
engineering that specifications are met. Additionally, safety can verify such
things as location and need for handholds, handling equipment attach points,
clearances, center of gravity locations, and also check such activity as covered
in procedural documents to establish their completeness in using the equipment.
A careful investigation of tangible hardware is usually a profitable exercise in
hazard identification, and it is surprising just how many real or potential
hazards overlooked during drawing reviews are discovered by actually looking
at the finished product. This type of activity may also be carried out during
reviews conducted at the manufacturing location.
Operations designate the period during which the commodity is packaged,
handled, stowed aboard a carrier, transported, off loaded, and the package
removed. The activity is governed by procedural documents that should include
provisions for avoiding known hazards. Many hazards to the commodity that
were identified as predictive precautions incorporated into design specifications
and procedural documents can be verified by auditing actual conditions. During
these audits many additional hazards that escaped notice may come to light.
In the example cited previously of air transporting a missile, an audit aimed
at checking off all energy sources actually encountered would in all probability
have identified atmospheric pressure differentials. In the event one-of-a-kind
or an extremely valuable commodity is transported, a dry run of actual opera-
tions may aid appreciably to energy source and release mechanisms identifica-
tion.
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To the list of activities making up "operations," package removal has
been added, since in many instance commodities are damaged during this
operation.
It is during actual movement that the commodity is most vulnerable to
damage from totally unexpected sources. For example, in the first overland
transit of an Atlas missile from San Diego to Patrick Air Force Base, the
missile arrived full of bullet holes. No one could have foreseen the threat
posed by irresponsible marksmen along the route. It is for this reason, to
minimize unexpected damage, that past histories of movements similar to the
one contemplated should be reviewed and the previous experience used during
hazard identification activities.
The preponderance of hazards arising from transportation activities
used thus far as illustrations have been those whose basic energies are bound
up in high energy environments. Given the diversity of these activities, how-
ever, there are hazards that threaten the commodity whose basic energy
sources originate in high energy components and low energy phenomena as well
as in the area of critical energy needs.
During the "operations" phase, handling activities are performed that
involve simply picking up the packaged or unpackaged commodity. Any time
the commodity is raised, either by hand or by the use of specialized handling
equipment (forklift trucks, cranes, derricks, etc.), potential energy is
imparted to it. If the commodity is dropped the potential energy is released
and will, unless the packaging is specifically designed to neutralize and
absorb the resulting foot-pounds of energy, inflict damage upon the commodity.
In those cases where unpackaged commodities are handled, potential energy
is a very serious source of potentially damaging energy that can be released by
a number of mechanisms arising from either acts of personnel or conditions
of the equipment or commodity. Improperly trained personnel operating the
handling equipment can, through a control or operating error, cause the
commodity to either strike the ground or strike an obstruction. Personnel can
improperly secure the commodity to the handling equipment, especially in the
absence of specially designed attach points, causing it to slip from the re-
straints, which in itself may impart sufficient shock loads to cause damage or
a fall to the ground. In moving by overhead crane or by forklift truck, the
commodity not only possesses potential energy by virtue of its elevation but
also kinetic energy imparted by the moving carrier. On one occasion a forklift
truck loaded with a "lift" of 24 gage galvanized sheet steel was proceeding
down an aisle in a storage area when a female employee, walking down an
intersecting aisle, appeared suddenly in front of the moving truck. The
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operator panicked and jammed on his brakes, releasing the kinetic as well as
the potential energy of the sheet steel. The end result was that the female's
heel was severed with almost surgical perfection. In this case an "act" was
the primary release mechanism, that of the operator's immediate application
of the vehicle's brakes. A condition also acted as a release mechanism, even
though it was of a secondary nature. The condition was the absence of "banding"
to secure the "lift" of steel together as a unit. If banding had been used, the
inertia would have been enough to have released only the potential energy and
the material would have only fallen to the floor in front of the truck, not
reaching the victim at all. This condition coupled with the characteristics of
the commodity, a very slick surface with an extremely low coefficient of
friction, very thin material, and wide flat sheets which contributed a dynamic
lifting factor, thus served to extend the range of the moving sheets and ensure
the subsequent events. In this case, damage was inflicted by the commodity,
not to the commodity, for the sheets were later cleaned, restacked, and
shipped to the customer.
There are situations where the carrier is subjected to severe buffeting
by the medium through which it travels, and the carrier imparts applied loads
to the stowed commodity; when the stowed commodity is properly battened, it
will move with the carrier but if it is improperly stowed and battened, it will
in all likelihood shift. The commodity may possess characteristics that will
destroy the carrier itself as well as inflict damage on itself; for example, in
cases.of kinetic energy being released and damage inflicted when the com-
modity strikes an obstruction.
In the case of the release of chemical energy, the most graphic exam-
ples lie in transporting chemicals, especially volatile chemicals. Ammonium
nitrate is a fertilizer; however, a ship containing this commodity was involved
in a very well known explosion in a Texas port some years ago which inflicted
catastrophic damage when the chemical energy was released. Transportation
of such chemicals as liquid oxygen, liquid hydrogen, red fuming nitric acid,
natural gas, reactive hydrocarbons, and the like all possess basic chemical
energy that may be released by either "acts" or "conditions" or a combination
of both. In situations of this nature, not only is the commodity as well as the
carrier generally lost but damage is inflicted on surroundings and may directly
cause loss of life or property damage.
The carrier itself may possess chemical energy by virtue of its opera-
tional characteristics in the form, for' example, of gasoline, oil and/or grease.
Leaking gasoline through loose fuel line connections or gas tank ruptures could
cause the carrier to burn, destroying itself as well as the commodity. Thus,
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the safety of the carrier has a direct bearing upon the safety of the commodity
during transportation. Wooden truck bodies covered with canvas have served
as tinder for an ignition source with loss of expensive and one-of-a-kind com-
modities in the ensuing fire. If, for example, an all-metal truck body replaced
the wood-canvas models, a fire might be averted even though the same ignition
source is present, since the tinder, the fuel (wood and cotton fabric), would not
be present. In terms of the energy-based doctrine, the energy source has been
isolated from the energy release mechanism.
At first glance the area of critical energy needs appears moot when
considering hazards in transportation. Careful thought will soon convince an
observant analyst that this area is definitely applicable, not only for critical
physical energy needs of the carrier in the form of steering and braking func-
tions but also for the preservation of certain perishable or fragile commodities.
Any commodity that requires controlled conditions to ensure its safe delivery
imposes energy needs to meet those controlled conditions. Refrigeration for
certain produce, dairy products, meats, etc., must be supplied and is critical
to the safety of the commodity. The current energy crisis is demonstrative
of this situation as when stranded long-haul carriers of produce lost their
cargos from spoilage when refrigeration systems had to be shut down. Trans-
portation of liquid oxygen and hydrogen imposes a heat shielding requirement
to ensure the very survival of the commodity. The necessity for maintaining
controlled environments implies the need for information and command to
ensure that conditions are maintained and to command environmental equipment
to perform its expected function. It was the need of controlled conditions that
led the Air Force to design containers for its missile which completely isolated
the missile from its surroundings while in transit from its Denver manufactur-
ing site.
Low energy phenomena also contribute to hazards adversely affecting
commodities during transportation. Physical deterioration by corrosion can
be induced by environmental conditions, as mentioned previously. Physical
contamination can easily be induced by dust particles in the air or by dirty
carriers on unprotected or poorly packaged commodities. Frozen foods that
may thaw during movement and then be refrozen may suffer bacterial growth
during that period which could later poison the ultimate consumer. Thus, while
the commodity is not physically contaminated, it is chemically contaminated
and becomes essentially a toxicant.
This brief review should serve to illustrate that all of the four classes
of hazardous energies are present to a greater or less degree in transportation
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activities, identified by the characteristics of the commodity itself, the
carrier, and the mode selected. To ensure thoroughness, however, it has
been suggested that the energy-based method be used for studies or investiga-
tions in each program phase, identifying first the energy source (Table 1) and
second, the release mechanism. Additionally, it has been suggested that
previous transportation activity be analyzed for the purpose of developing
"disciplined" checklists which record not only the identified hazard, but also
the measures initiated for its elimination or control (Figs. 6 and 7).
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